

114TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 2119

To provide for greater congressional oversight of Iran’s nuclear program,
and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER 1, 2015

Mr. CARDIN (for himself, Mr. BENNET, Mr. BLUMENTHAL, Mr. WYDEN, Mr. COONS, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. WARNER, Mr. BOOKER, and Mr. SCHATZ) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To provide for greater congressional oversight of Iran’s
nuclear program, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the
5 “Iran Policy Oversight Act of 2015”.

6 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
7 this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Findings.
- Sec. 3. Statement of policy on deterrence.
- Sec. 4. Regional strategy for countering conventional and asymmetric Iranian activity and threats in the Middle East and North Africa.

- Sec. 5. Authorization of additional security assistance to Israel.
- Sec. 6. Continuation in effect of sanctions with respect to Iranian entities and individuals engaged in ballistic or cruise missile proliferation, or terrorism.
- Sec. 7. Continuation in effect of sanctions with respect to human rights abuses by Iran.
- Sec. 8. Reports on Iranian use of funds received as part of sanctions relief under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
- Sec. 9. Expedited consideration of new terrorism-related sanctions against Iran.
- Sec. 10. Statements of policy.
- Sec. 11. Reports on Iranian research and development and breakout times.
- Sec. 12. Reporting on resolution of Iran's past military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program.
- Sec. 13. Statement of policy on effective re-imposition of sanctions.
- Sec. 14. United States coordinator for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
- Sec. 15. Unified policy on arms and ballistic and cruise missile sales to Iran.
- Sec. 16. International Atomic Energy Agency.
- Sec. 17. Definitions.

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress makes the following findings:

3 (1) On May 22, 2015, the President signed into
4 law the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015
5 (Public Law 114–17), a bill that passed the United
6 States Congress with broad bipartisan support, con-
7 tinuing the robust role the Congress has played in
8 oversight of the United States policy of preventing
9 Iran from becoming a nuclear weapon state.

10 (2) On July 14, 2015, the United States,
11 France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the People's
12 Republic of China and the Russian Federation, with
13 the High Representative of the European Union for
14 Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Iran an-
15 nounced the completion of a Joint Comprehensive
16 Plan of Action (JCPOA), specifying steps to be
17 taken by Iran related to its nuclear program.

1 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON DETERRENCE.**

2 It is the policy of the United States—

3 (1) that Iran does not have an inherent right
4 to uranium enrichment;

5 (2) to deter Iran from destabilizing regional ac-
6 tivity and support for and acts of terrorism; and

7 (3) that all of the options available to the
8 United States, including the military option, remain
9 available to prevent Iran from achieving a nuclear
10 weapons capability.

11 **SEC. 4. REGIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING CONVEN-**
12 **TIONAL AND ASYMMETRIC IRANIAN ACTIVITY**
13 **AND THREATS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND**
14 **NORTH AFRICA.**

15 Not later than January 10, 2016, and every two
16 years thereafter, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
17 Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director
18 of National Intelligence shall jointly develop and submit
19 to the appropriate congressional committees an unclassi-
20 fied ten-year strategy (which may contain a classified
21 annex) to counter conventional and asymmetric Iranian
22 activities and threats in the Middle East, North Africa,
23 and beyond. The strategy shall include at a minimum the
24 following elements:

25 (1) A summary of the near and long-term
26 United States objectives, plans, and means for build-

1 ing a regional security architecture capable of and
2 committed to countering Iran’s destabilizing activi-
3 ties.

4 (2) A summary of United States objectives for
5 individual country capabilities and contributions to
6 the regional security architecture, including an esti-
7 mated timeline for achieving desired capabilities, for
8 each member of the Gulf Cooperation Council,
9 Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Israel.

10 (3) An assessment of Iran’s grand strategy and
11 objectives for the Middle East region, and an assess-
12 ment of anticipated modifications to Iranian objec-
13 tives, policies, and activities for achieving the grand
14 strategy.

15 (4) An assessment of Iran’s conventional force
16 capabilities, and an assessment of Iranian plans to
17 upgrade its conventional force capabilities, including
18 its acquisition, development, and deployment of bal-
19 listic and cruise missile capabilities, unmanned aerial
20 vehicles, and maritime offensive and anti-access/area
21 denial capabilities, at 5, 8, and 10 years following
22 the date of the enactment of this Act.

23 (5) An assessment of Iran’s chemical and bio-
24 logical weapons capabilities, and an assessment of

1 Iranian plans to upgrade its chemical and biological
2 weapons capabilities.

3 (6) An assessment of Iran’s asymmetric activi-
4 ties in the region, including—

5 (A) the size, capabilities, and activities of
6 the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, includ-
7 ing the Quds Force;

8 (B) the size, capabilities, and activities of
9 Iran’s cyber operations;

10 (C) the types and amount of support, in-
11 cluding funding, lethal and non-lethal contribu-
12 tions, and training, provided to Hezbollah,
13 Hamas, special groups in Iraq, the Bashar al-
14 Assad regime in Syria, Houthi fighters in
15 Yemen, and other violent groups across the
16 Middle East;

17 (D) the scope and objectives of Iranian in-
18 formation operations and use of propaganda;
19 and

20 (E) an assessment of anticipated modifica-
21 tions by Iran to the activities described in sub-
22 paragraphs (A) through (D) over the course of
23 the next 10 to 15 years.

24 (7) An assessment of Iran’s strategy regarding
25 other countries in the region, including Syria, Leb-

1 anon, Iraq, Yemen, the Palestinian territories, and
2 the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and
3 an assessment of any anticipated modifications to
4 objectives, policies, and activities for achieving the
5 grand strategy.

6 (8) A description of current and planned activi-
7 ties, engagements, exercises, military sales, training,
8 intelligence and surveillance support, and other
9 forms of security assistance and cooperation for
10 United States partners and allies in the region, in
11 order to actively counter current Iranian conven-
12 tional and asymmetric threats described under para-
13 graphs (3) through (7), as well as to prepare for
14 evolving threats from Iran over the course of the
15 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, including an
16 assessment of the impact of activities described in
17 paragraph (7) on Israel's qualitative military edge.

18 (9) An outline of United States authorities,
19 planning, and actions, unilaterally and in coopera-
20 tion with foreign governments, to counter threats
21 from Iran's conventional force capabilities described
22 under paragraph (4).

23 (10) An outline, including specific examples, of
24 United States authorities, planning, and actions,
25 unilaterally and in cooperation with foreign govern-

1 ments, to counter Iran’s threat network described
2 under subparagraphs (A) through (E) of paragraph
3 (6) and paragraph (7), including—

4 (A) interdiction of Iranian lethal arms
5 bound for groups designated as foreign terrorist
6 organizations by the United States under sec-
7 tion 219 of the Immigration and Nationality
8 Act (8 U.S.C. 1189);

9 (B) interdiction of Iranian activities and
10 prevention of Iranian harassment or inter-
11 ference in international commercial shipping
12 lanes;

13 (C) countering Iranian attempts to under-
14 mine or subvert internationally recognized gov-
15 ernments in the Middle East region; and

16 (D) countering Iran’s support for the re-
17 gime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, including—

18 (i) financial assistance, military equip-
19 ment and personnel, and other support
20 provided to that regime; and

21 (ii) support and direction to other
22 armed actors that are not Syrian or Ira-
23 nian and are acting on behalf of that re-
24 gime.

1 (11) A review of individual country contribu-
2 tions to the regional security architecture.

3 (12) A review of efforts to counter Iran's con-
4 ventional and asymmetric capabilities in the Middle
5 East and North Africa.

6 (13) An assessment of the commitment and ca-
7 pabilities of United States allies and partners to
8 countering Iran's conventional and asymmetric capa-
9 bilities in the Middle East and North Africa.

10 **SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF ADDITIONAL SECURITY ASSIST-**
11 **ANCE TO ISRAEL.**

12 (a) SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO ADDRESS IRANIAN
13 NUCLEAR FACILITIES.—

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized
15 to take all necessary and appropriate measures, in-
16 cluding providing offensive security assistance and
17 applicable ordnance and delivery systems, to enhance
18 Israel's qualitative military edge, effectively deter
19 conventional and nuclear threats from Iran, and
20 counter non-peaceful nuclear activities by Iran.

21 (2) DEPLOYMENT.—Pursuant to consultations
22 between the Governments of Israel and the United
23 States, the President may, consistent with United
24 States treaty obligations, transfer to the Government
25 of Israel, as appropriate, ordnance and delivery sys-

1 tems under such terms and conditions as the Presi-
2 dent determines necessary, pursuant to the authority
3 of paragraph (1). The President shall, as appro-
4 priate, ensure that Israeli personnel have the oppor-
5 tunity and means to train with such defense sys-
6 tems, including joint training exercises, consistent
7 with the requirements of this paragraph.

8 (b) FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING.—

9 (1) FINDING.—Congress finds that the Memo-
10 randum of Understanding between the United States
11 and Israel setting annual foreign military financing
12 levels for Israel is set to conclude at the end of fiscal
13 year 2018, and the terms of its extension will be re-
14 negotiated over the 2015 through 2018 time period.

15 (2) AUTHORIZATION.—The President is author-
16 ized to provide any additional foreign military fi-
17 nancing to Israel in each fiscal year from fiscal year
18 2018 through fiscal year 2028 as may be needed to
19 address threats from Iran.

20 (c) REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE.—The
21 President shall provide, as appropriate, assistance and co-
22 operation to Israel to ensure Israel’s qualitative military
23 edge and effectively deter conventional and nuclear threats
24 supported, directly or indirectly, by Iran.

1 (d) UNITED STATES-ISRAEL MILITARY AND INTEL-
2 LIGENCE COOPERATION.—

3 (1) FINDING.—Congress finds that the United
4 States and Israel have an established record of un-
5 precedented military and intelligence cooperation,
6 most recently furthered by the United States-Israel
7 Strategic Partnership Act of 2014 (Public Law 113–
8 296), which designated Israel as a major strategic
9 partner of the United States.

10 (2) AUTHORIZATION.—The President is author-
11 ized to accelerate co-development and support Israeli
12 development of missile defense systems, and to en-
13 gage in discussions to bolster the effectiveness of
14 Israel’s conventional deterrent and deepen intel-
15 ligence cooperation.

16 **SEC. 6. CONTINUATION IN EFFECT OF SANCTIONS WITH RE-**
17 **SPECT TO IRANIAN ENTITIES AND INDIVID-**
18 **UALS ENGAGED IN BALLISTIC OR CRUISE**
19 **MISSILE PROLIFERATION, OR TERRORISM.**

20 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy
21 of the United States, in interpreting the Joint Comprehen-
22 sive Plan of Action, that nothing in the JCPOA limits or
23 curtails the ability of Congress to pass sanctions legisla-
24 tion to address future Iranian terrorism activities and bal-
25 listic and cruise missile activities.

1 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
2 gress that the Department of the Treasury’s Office of For-
3 eign Assets Control should be fully funded to ensure strict
4 enforcement of sanctions against Iranian actors in the
5 areas of ballistic or cruise missile proliferation and ter-
6 rorism, and to ensure effective re-imposition of sanctions
7 in the event of violation or breach by Iran of the JCPOA.

8 (c) IN GENERAL.—Subtitle B of title II of the Iran
9 Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012
10 (22 U.S.C. 8721 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
11 the following:

12 **“SEC. 225. CONTINUATION IN EFFECT OF SANCTIONS WITH**
13 **RESPECT TO IRANIAN ENTITIES AND INDI-**
14 **VIDUALS ENGAGED IN BALLISTIC, CRUISE**
15 **MISSILE PROLIFERATION, OR TERRORISM.**

16 “(a) SANCTIONS RELATING TO BLOCKING OF PROP-
17 erty.—United States sanctions applicable with respect to
18 Iranian persons, unless designated by name in Attach-
19 ments 3 or 4 to Annex II of the Joint Comprehensive Plan
20 of Action, under Executive Order 13382 (50 U.S.C. 1701
21 note; relating to blocking property of weapons of mass de-
22 struction proliferators and their supporters), or Executive
23 Order 13224 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking
24 property and prohibiting transactions with persons who
25 commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism), as in

1 effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this
2 section, shall remain in effect until the President makes
3 public the notification described in subsection (b).

4 “(b) NOTIFICATION DESCRIBED.—The notification
5 described in this subsection is one that provides a jus-
6 tification in writing for removing sanctions applicable to
7 an Iranian person sanctioned pursuant to Executive Order
8 13382 or 13224 and is submitted in a timely manner.

9 “(c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec-
10 tion shall be construed to limit the authority of the Presi-
11 dent pursuant to the International Emergency Economic
12 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the Comprehensive
13 Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of
14 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.), or any other provision of
15 law.

16 “(d) JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION DE-
17 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘Joint Comprehensive
18 Plan of Action’ means the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
19 Action signed at Vienna on July 14, 2015, by Iran and
20 by France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the People’s
21 Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and the United
22 States, and all implementing materials and agreements re-
23 lated to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.”.

24 (d) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents
25 for the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights

1 Act of 2012 is amended by inserting after the item relat-
2 ing to section 224 the following new item:

“Sec. 225. Continuation in effect of sanctions with respect to Iranian entities
and individuals engaged in ballistic or cruise missile prolifera-
tion.”.

3 **SEC. 7. CONTINUATION IN EFFECT OF SANCTIONS WITH RE-**
4 **SPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY IRAN.**

5 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy
6 of the United States, in interpreting the Joint Comprehen-
7 sive Plan of Action, that nothing in the JCPOA limits or
8 curtails the ability of Congress to pass sanctions legisla-
9 tion to address future Iranian human rights abuses.

10 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
11 gress that the Department of the Treasury’s Office of For-
12 eign Assets Control should be fully funded to ensure strict
13 enforcement of sanctions against Iranian actors that com-
14 mit human rights abuses, and to ensure effective re-impo-
15 sition of sanctions in the event of violation or breach by
16 Iran of the JCPOA.

17 (c) SANCTIONS RELATING TO ABUSES OF HUMAN
18 RIGHTS.—United States sanctions applicable with respect
19 to persons, unless designated by name in Attachments 3
20 or 4 of Annex II of the JCPOA, under Executive Order
21 13553, Executive Order 13606, or sections 2 or 3 of Exec-
22 utive Order 13628, as in effect on the day before the date
23 of the enactment of this section, shall remain in effect

1 until the President makes public the notification described
2 in subsection (d).

3 (d) NOTIFICATION DESCRIBED.—The notification de-
4 scribed in this subsection is one that provides a justifica-
5 tion in writing for removing sanctions applicable to an Ira-
6 nian person sanctioned pursuant to Executive Order
7 13553, Executive Order 13606, or section 2 or 3 of Execu-
8 tive Order 13628, and is submitted in a timely manner.

9 (e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec-
10 tion shall be construed to limit the authority of the Presi-
11 dent pursuant to the International Emergency Economic
12 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the Comprehensive
13 Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of
14 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.), or any other provision of
15 law.

16 **SEC. 8. REPORTS ON IRANIAN USE OF FUNDS RECEIVED AS**
17 **PART OF SANCTIONS RELIEF UNDER THE**
18 **JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION.**

19 Not later than January 10, 2016, and every 180 days
20 thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate
21 congressional committees—

22 (1) a description of—

23 (A) the monetary value of direct and indi-
24 rect sanctions relief received by Iran;

1 (B) increases in funding for the IRGC and
2 its Quds Force; and

3 (C) changes in funding for regional activi-
4 ties and support for terrorist organizations, in-
5 cluding Hezbollah, Hamas, and the regime of
6 Bashar al-Assad; and

7 (2) a determination on whether persons, includ-
8 ing foreign financial institutions, providing financial
9 support or assistance to any entity described in sub-
10 paragraphs (B) and (C) of paragraph (1) are subject
11 to United States economic sanctions.

12 **SEC. 9. EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF NEW TERRORISM-**
13 **RELATED SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN.**

14 (a) DETERMINATION.—If the President determines
15 that the Government of Iran has directed or conducted
16 an act of international terrorism against the United States
17 or that the Government of Iran has substantially increased
18 its operational or financial support for a terrorist organi-
19 zation that threatens the interests or allies of the United
20 States, the President shall immediately notify Congress.

21 (b) QUALIFYING LEGISLATION DEFINED.—For pur-
22 poses of this section, the term “qualifying legislation”
23 means only a bill of either House of Congress that author-
24 izes or requires the President to impose sanctions on per-
25 sons the President determines—

1 (1) commit acts of international terrorism, at
 2 the direction of an official of the Government of
 3 Iran, that threaten the security of nationals of the
 4 United States or the national security, foreign pol-
 5 icy, or economy of the United States; or

6 (2) knowingly assist in, sponsor, or provide fi-
 7 nancial, material, or technological support for, or fi-
 8 nancial or other services to or in support of—

9 (A) acts described in paragraph (1); or

10 (B) foreign terrorist organizations that re-
 11 ceive financial or other material support from
 12 the Government of Iran.

13 (c) INTRODUCTION.—During the 60-calendar day pe-
 14 riod after the President notifies Congress of a determina-
 15 tion under subsection (a), qualifying legislation may be in-
 16 troduced—

17 (1) in the House of Representatives, by the Ma-
 18 jority Leader or the Minority Leader; and

19 (2) in the Senate, by the Majority Leader (or
 20 the Majority leader’s designee) or the Minority
 21 Leader (or the Minority Leader’s designee).

22 (d) FLOOR CONSIDERATION IN HOUSE OF REP-
 23 RESENTATIVES.—

24 (1) REPORTING AND DISCHARGE.—If a com-
 25 mittee of the House to which qualifying legislation

1 has been referred has not reported such qualifying
2 legislation within 10 legislative days after the date
3 of referral, that committee shall be discharged from
4 further consideration thereof.

5 (2) PROCEEDING TO CONSIDERATION.—Begin-
6 ning on the third legislative day after each com-
7 mittee to which qualifying legislation has been re-
8 ferred reports it to the House or has been dis-
9 charged from further consideration thereof, it shall
10 be in order to move to proceed to consider the quali-
11 fying legislation in the House. All points of order
12 against the motion are waived. Such a motion shall
13 not be in order after the House has disposed of a
14 motion to proceed on the qualifying legislation with
15 regard to the same agreement. The previous ques-
16 tion shall be considered as ordered on the motion to
17 its adoption without intervening motion. The motion
18 shall not be debatable. A motion to reconsider the
19 vote by which the motion is disposed of shall not be
20 in order.

21 (3) CONSIDERATION.—The qualifying legisla-
22 tion shall be considered as read. All points of order
23 against the qualifying legislation and against its con-
24 sideration are waived. The previous question shall be
25 considered as ordered on the qualifying legislation to

1 final passage without intervening motion except two
2 hours of debate equally divided and controlled by the
3 sponsor of the qualifying legislation (or a designee)
4 and an opponent. A motion to reconsider the vote on
5 passage of the qualifying legislation shall not be in
6 order.

7 (e) CONSIDERATION IN THE SENATE.—

8 (1) COMMITTEE REFERRAL.—Qualifying legisla-
9 tion introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the
10 Committee on Foreign Relations.

11 (2) REPORTING AND DISCHARGE.—If the Com-
12 mittee on Foreign Relations has not reported such
13 qualifying legislation within 10 session days after
14 the date of referral of such legislation, that com-
15 mittee shall be discharged from further consider-
16 ation of such legislation and the qualifying legisla-
17 tion shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.

18 (3) PROCEEDING TO CONSIDERATION.—Not-
19 withstanding Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of
20 the Senate, it is in order at any time after the com-
21 mittee authorized to consider qualifying legislation
22 reports it to the Senate or has been discharged from
23 its consideration (even though a previous motion to
24 the same effect has been disagreed to) to move to
25 proceed to the consideration of qualifying legislation,

1 and all points of order against qualifying legislation
2 (and against consideration of the qualifying legisla-
3 tion) are waived. The motion to proceed is not de-
4 batable and shall be subject to a 60-vote affirmative
5 threshold for adoption. The motion is not subject to
6 a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider the
7 vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed
8 to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to
9 the consideration of the qualifying legislation is
10 agreed to, the qualifying legislation shall remain the
11 unfinished business until disposed of.

12 (4) DEBATE.—Debate on qualifying legislation,
13 and on all debatable motions and appeals in connec-
14 tion therewith, shall be limited to not more than 10
15 hours, which shall be divided equally between the
16 Majority and Minority Leaders or their designees. A
17 motion to further limit debate is in order and not
18 debatable. An amendment to, or a motion to post-
19 pone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of
20 other business, or a motion to recommit the quali-
21 fying legislation is not in order.

22 (5) VOTE ON PASSAGE.—The vote on passage
23 shall occur immediately following the conclusion of
24 the debate on the qualifying legislation and a single

1 quorum call at the conclusion of the debate, if re-
2 quested in accordance with the rules of the Senate.

3 (6) RULINGS OF THE CHAIR ON PROCEDURE.—
4 Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to
5 the application of the rules of the Senate, as the
6 case may be, to the procedure relating to qualifying
7 legislation shall be decided without debate.

8 (7) CONSIDERATION OF VETO MESSAGES.—De-
9 bate in the Senate of any veto message with respect
10 to qualifying legislation, including all debatable mo-
11 tions and appeals in connection with such qualifying
12 legislation, shall be limited to 10 hours, to be equally
13 divided between, and controlled by, the majority
14 leader and the Minority Leader or their designees.

15 (f) RULES RELATING TO SENATE AND HOUSE OF
16 REPRESENTATIVES.—

17 (1) COORDINATION WITH ACTION BY OTHER
18 HOUSE.—If, before the passage by one House of
19 qualifying legislation of that House, that House re-
20 ceives qualifying legislation from the other House,
21 then the following procedures shall apply:

22 (A) The qualifying legislation of the other
23 House shall not be referred to a committee.

24 (B) With respect to qualifying legislation
25 of the House receiving the legislation—

1 (i) the procedure in that House shall
 2 be the same as if no qualifying legislation
 3 had been received from the other House;
 4 but

5 (ii) the vote on passage shall be on
 6 the qualifying legislation of the other
 7 House.

8 (2) TREATMENT OF A BILL OF OTHER
 9 HOUSE.—If one House fails to introduce qualifying
 10 legislation under this section, the qualifying legisla-
 11 tion of the other House shall be entitled to expedited
 12 floor procedures under this section.

13 (3) TREATMENT OF COMPANION MEASURES.—
 14 If, following passage of the qualifying legislation in
 15 the Senate, the Senate then receives a companion
 16 measure from the House of Representatives, the
 17 companion measure shall not be debatable.

18 (4) APPLICATION TO REVENUE MEASURES.—
 19 The provisions of this subsection shall not apply in
 20 the House of Representatives to qualifying legisla-
 21 tion which is a revenue measure.

22 (g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

23 (1) FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.—The
 24 term “foreign terrorist organization” means an or-
 25 ganization designated as a foreign terrorist organiza-

1 tion under section 219 of the Immigration and Na-
2 tionality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189).

3 (2) KNOWINGLY.—The term “knowingly” has
4 the meaning given that term in section 14 of the
5 Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172;
6 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).

7 **SEC. 10. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.**

8 It shall be the policy of the United States, in inter-
9 preting the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),
10 and any other related agreement, that—

11 (1) no sanctions relief for Iran is to be provided
12 pursuant to the JCPOA until Iran completes all ac-
13 tivities as set forth in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, and 6 of
14 the Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present
15 Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Pro-
16 gram, signed at Vienna July 14, 2015, between the
17 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
18 Iran, and the completion of such activities is verified
19 by the IAEA in a regular update by the Director
20 General of the IAEA;

21 (2) any action by the Government of Iran to
22 treat the legitimate imposition of sanctions by the
23 United States or its international partners based on
24 support for terrorism, abuses of human rights, or
25 Iran’s ballistic or cruise missile activities as grounds

1 to cease performing on its commitments under the
2 JCPOA in whole or in part would not be valid and
3 would be inconsistent with the terms of the JCPOA;
4 and

5 (3) in the event that sanctions on Iran are re-
6 imposed consistent with the JCPOA, such sanctions
7 would not retroactively apply to activities, including
8 activities under contractual arrangements, legiti-
9 mately entered into prior to the re-imposition of
10 sanctions, but sanctions may apply to activities, in-
11 cluding activities under contractual arrangements
12 entered into prior to the re-imposition of sanctions,
13 to the extent such activities continue beyond the
14 date of the re-imposition of sanctions.

15 **SEC. 11. REPORTS ON IRANIAN RESEARCH AND DEVELOP-**
16 **MENT AND BREAKOUT TIMES.**

17 Section 135(d) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is
18 amended by adding at the end the following new para-
19 graph:

20 “(8) REPORT ON IRANIAN RESEARCH AND DE-
21 VELOPMENT AND BREAKOUT TIMES.—Not later than
22 January 10, 2016, and every 180 days thereafter,
23 the President shall submit to the appropriate con-
24 gressional committees and leadership a report detail-
25 ing—

1 “(A) any research and development con-
2 ducted by Iran that is not in compliance with
3 the JCPOA or that may substantially reduce
4 the time for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon;

5 “(B) an assessment of the period of time
6 it would take Iran to acquire the nuclear mate-
7 rial to produce one nuclear weapon; and

8 “(C) an assessment of the capacity and ca-
9 pability of the IAEA to effectively implement
10 the verification regime required by the JCPOA,
11 including whether the IAEA is receiving suffi-
12 cient access to investigate suspicious sites or al-
13 legations of covert nuclear-related activities and
14 whether it has the required funding, manpower,
15 and authorities to undertake the verification re-
16 gime required by the JCPOA.”.

17 **SEC. 12. REPORTING ON RESOLUTION OF IRAN’S PAST**
18 **MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF IRAN’S NUCLEAR**
19 **PROGRAM.**

20 Not later than 30 calendar days after the IAEA sub-
21 mits its final assessment on the resolution on all past and
22 present outstanding issues related to Iran’s nuclear pro-
23 gram to the Board of Governors, the President shall sub-
24 mit to the appropriate congressional committees and lead-
25 ership a detailed report on the IAEA’s report to the Board

1 of Governors, and shall provide to the appropriate congres-
2 sional committees and leadership a briefing, in a classified
3 setting as necessary, on how outstanding issues were re-
4 solved by the IAEA.

5 **SEC. 13. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON EFFECTIVE RE-IMPOSI-**
6 **TION OF SANCTIONS.**

7 (a) FINDING.—There is a wide range of national and
8 multilateral tools, including the re-imposition of sanctions,
9 available to the United States and United States partners,
10 including European allies, should Iran fail to meet its
11 JCPOA commitments.

12 (b) STATEMENTS OF POLICY.—

13 (1) The United States is prepared to enforce
14 any violation of the JCPOA.

15 (2) The United States should continue to en-
16 sure that a range of national and multilateral tools
17 remain available to respond to non-performance by
18 Iran of its JCPOA commitments.

19 (3) The United States will continue to leverage
20 the commitments of its European allies to join in re-
21 imposing sanctions in a calibrated manner as appro-
22 priate in the event Iran violates the JCPOA incre-
23 mentally.

1 **SEC. 14. UNITED STATES COORDINATOR FOR THE JOINT**
2 **COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION.**

3 (a) DESIGNATION.—The President shall designate
4 within the Department of State a special coordinator for
5 implementation of and compliance with the Joint Com-
6 prehensive Plan of Action regarding the Iran’s nuclear
7 program (in this section referred to as the “Coordinator”).

8 (b) STATUS.—The role of the Coordinator should be
9 filled by an official of the Department of State appointed
10 by and serving at the pleasure of the President.

11 (c) DUTIES.—The Coordinator shall carry out the fol-
12 lowing duties:

13 (1) Coordinate all activities related to imple-
14 mentation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Ac-
15 tion, including—

16 (A) activities of the United States Govern-
17 ment necessary for implementation of the Joint
18 Comprehensive Plan of Action;

19 (B) activities of the United States Govern-
20 ment to monitor all elements of the implemen-
21 tation of the JCPOA by Iran and track all
22 incidences of noncompliance with the JCPOA;
23 and

24 (C) with the Secretary of Energy, activities
25 of the United States Government with respect
26 to the JCPOA that involve the International

1 Atomic Energy Agency and other nongovern-
2 mental or multilateral organizations, as appro-
3 priate.

4 (2) Coordinate with the Department of the
5 Treasury and other agencies as appropriate—

6 (A) to ensure the continued comprehensive
7 investigation and designation of persons pro-
8 viding support for, or otherwise facilitating, the
9 ability of the Government of Iran—

10 (i) to acquire, develop, or engage in
11 the proliferation of ballistic missiles or
12 cruise missiles;

13 (ii) to support, directly or indirectly,
14 acts of international terrorism; or

15 (iii) to commit human rights abuses;
16 and

17 (B) to assess and report on the use by the
18 Government of Iran of funds made available
19 through sanctions relief.

20 (d) CONSULTATIONS.—The Coordinator shall consult
21 with Congress, domestic and international nongovern-
22 mental organizations, and multilateral organizations and
23 institutions as the Coordinator considers appropriate to
24 fulfill the purposes of this section.

1 **SEC. 15. UNIFIED POLICY ON ARMS AND BALLISTIC AND**
2 **CRUISE MISSILE SALES TO IRAN.**

3 It is the sense of Congress that Iran should continue
4 to be prohibited from undertaking any activity related to
5 ballistic or cruise missiles capable of delivering nuclear
6 weapons, including launches using ballistic or cruise mis-
7 sile technology, and United Nations member states should
8 take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer of
9 technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such
10 activities.

11 **SEC. 16. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY.**

12 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
13 gress that the International Atomic Energy Agency
14 (IAEA) must have sufficient funding, manpower, and au-
15 thority to undertake its verification responsibilities related
16 to the JCPOA or any other related agreement, and the
17 President should engage with international partners to en-
18 sure that the IAEA receives the full additional
19 \$10,600,000 per year necessary to fulfill its verification
20 responsibilities under the JCPOA or any other related
21 agreement.

22 (b) REPORT.—Not later than January 10, 2016, and
23 every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to
24 the appropriate congressional committees a report out-
25 lining efforts with international partners to achieve the

1 goal in subsection (a) and identifying impediments to
2 achieving the goal.

3 (c) AUTHORIZATION.—There are authorized to be ap-
4 propriated for fiscal years 2016 through 2026 such sums
5 as may be necessary to meet the United States annual
6 funding commitments to the IAEA as well as the United
7 States portion of additional funds needed for the IAEA
8 to fulfill its verification responsibilities under the JCPOA
9 or any other related agreement.

10 **SEC. 17. DEFINITIONS.**

11 In this Act:

12 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
13 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
14 mittees” means—

15 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
16 the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
17 Urban Affairs, and the Select Committee on In-
18 telligence of the Senate; and

19 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
20 Committee on Financial Services, and the Per-
21 manent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
22 House of Representatives.

23 (2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
24 TEES AND LEADERSHIP.—The term “appropriate
25 congressional committees and leadership” means the

1 appropriate congressional committees, the Majority
2 and Minority Leaders of the Senate, and the Speak-
3 er, Majority Leader, and Minority Leader of the
4 House of Representatives.

5 (3) JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION.—
6 The term “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”
7 means the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
8 signed at Vienna on July 14, 2015, by Iran and by
9 France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the Peo-
10 ple’s Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and
11 the United States, and all implementing materials
12 and agreements related to the Joint Comprehensive
13 Plan of Action.

14 (4) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term
15 “intelligence community” means the intelligence
16 community specified in or designated under section
17 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
18 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

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